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THE NEW POLIDCS OF PORNOGRAPHY. By Donald 
A. Downs. 1 Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. 1989. 
Pp. xxiv, 252. Cloth, $42.00; paper, $14.95. 
Francis Canavan 2 
This book deals with, but goes beyond, the initially successful 
efforts to get the city councils of Minneapolis in 1983, and of Indi-
anapolis the following year, to pass anti-pornography ordinances 
based on a feminist definition of pornography. I say initially suc-
cessful because, although two nationally prominent feminist activ-
ists, Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, persuaded both 
city councils to enact the ordinances they proposed, the Minneapo-
lis ordinance was vetoed by the mayor and the Indianapolis one was 
declared unconstitutional by federal courts. Nonetheless, although 
the ordinances were finally struck down, the arguments for them 
and the tactics by which they were pushed through the city councils 
constitute "the new politics of pornography." 
Professor Donald Downs gives a detailed account, in two of his 
five chapters, of the political process by which the ordinances were 
adopted. The process, however, is of less importance in his eyes 
than the "challenge to the modem doctrine of free expression" 
which it represented. The challenge, in tum, was provoked by "the 
recent explosion of pornography" in this country. 
The new politics of pornography ultimately failed in Minneap-
olis and Indianapolis. But the resistance to the swelling tide of por-
nography that it symbolized will continue, and "suggests that 
society is presently reconsidering liberal tenets. At issue is which 
philosophy should govern free speech." This book addresses that 
issue, and properly so because, despite the ritual invocation of the 
first amendment by the press, it is not the amendment itself which is 
in question but the interpretation to be put on it. 
Downs rejects the absolutist position taken in Minneapolis by 
the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union: "The MCLU would admit no 
line between tolerable and intolerable expression; any effort to deal 
with the potential harms of certain types of pornography was a 
threat to intellectual freedom." But he acknowledges three inter-
pretations of the constitutional guarantee that deserve consideration 
in the controversy over the legal regulation of pornography. 
The first is "the modem doctrine of free expression," which he 
1. Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
2. Professor emeritus of Political Science, Fordham University. 
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sees as based on the liberal conception of society propounded by 
Ronald Dworkin. In Dworkin's words, equality means that "polit-
ical decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of any partic-
ular conception of the good life, or what gives value to life." 
Government therefore does not treat its citizens as equals "if it pre-
fers one conception to another, either because the officials believe 
that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is held by the more 
numerous or more powerful group." Downs does not think that 
Dworkin's liberalism does or should mold public policy in all areas 
of American life, but says: 
What it does capture is the essence of the modem doctrine of speech, which man-
dates state neutrality toward the content of speech that has intellectual or social 
value and forbids discrimination among viewpoints for all types of expression. The 
state, of course, promotes dift'erent substantive moral ends, depending upon which 
political party or alliance controls it, but the modern doctrine of speech requires 
that all speech, if it can claim the necessary intellectual value, be equally un-
restricted under the law. 
In addition to state neutrality as to the content of speech and 
no discrimination among viewpoints, liberal doctrine permits legal 
restraint of speech only upon the "demonstration of direct harms" 
caused by the speech. The only exception is the limited category of 
unprotected kinds of speech which the Supreme Court established 
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,J and has made still more limited 
in subsequent decisions. 
The "harm principle," Downs explains, "is central to the lib-
eral doctrine of individualism because it protects liberty until the 
state finds specific, demonstrable, and sufficiently substantial harm 
resulting from it." This principle "is part of the movement from a 
traditional, communitarian theory of freedom to an individualist 
conception of legal right and responsibility." Hence the insistence 
that pornography is protected speech until it can be shown to cause 
specific, demonstrable, and substantial harm to individuals. Ameri-
can law still regards obscenity as in itself unprotected speech, but 
that is "a concept which derives from traditional morality and 
therefore represents a compromise between liberalism and conserva-
tism." Liberals, however, "tend to interpret pornography in relativ-
istic, individualistic terms. Moral judgments or values are mere 
'metaphysics.' " So too, it follows, is the idea of a public morality. 
Conservatism, the second of the interpretations mentioned 
above, sees pornography as "the explosive culmination of this lib-
eral public philosophy" and asserts "the need for values and stan-
dards in society." Just as the liberal doctrine of free speech is 
3. 315 u.s. 568 (1942). 
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derived from an individualistic theory of the nature of man and so-
ciety, so the conservative doctrine is communitarian and based on 
"a normative notion of human nature and sexuality." There is, that 
is to say, a common human nature, of which sex is a constituent 
part, from which flow norms of conduct valid for all men, whether 
individuals or particular cultures agree with them or not, and these 
norms may, at least to some extent, be enforced by law. 
Downs does not reject a normative view of sexuality out of 
hand. "While such a theory is inescapably bound to its time and 
place-today's deviance can be tomorrow's accepted practice-it is 
a mistake to dismiss all normative approaches as misguided tradi-
tionalism. . . . In defining ourselves as human, we necessarily posit 
some normative framework." A true child of his age, he hastens to 
add: "Because the standards of our own culture inevitably seem 
'natural' and compelling, we must always remain skeptical and re-
examine our assumptions." 
He does agree, however, that pornography can "depersonalize 
the viewer," either by representing "a patently dehumanized model 
of sexuality" or by making the viewer "dependent upon the [porno-
graphic] material, which then serves as a substitute for relations 
with another person." "Depersonalize" and "dehumanize" are nor-
mative terms which assume a normative human nature, and Downs 
uses them as such. But it is typical of his treatment of pornography 
that he will not allow law to be based on these normative ideas: 
"The law has no way of determining when the use of pornography 
assumes this character, unless it is willing to crash through the 
walls of privacy and invade even the realm of thought." But why 
must the law judge what is going on in the mind of the viewer 
before it can pass judgment on what he is viewing? No doubt there 
are university professors who can watch pornographic films without 
being affected by them, yet even they should be able to recognize the 
effect that the films are designed to produce in their viewers. 
The third interpretation of pornography and free speech is the 
feminist one that inspired "the new politics of pornography." "The 
feminist critique of pornography," Downs explains, "rejects both 
the moralism of the conservative position and the freedom of choice 
of liberalism." In the feminist view, what is wrong with pornogra-
phy is not that it impairs the morals of males by being sexually 
explicit and erotically arousing but that it is "an ideological instru-
ment of male domination" of women. Hence, as Catherine Mac-
Kinnon has said, "the feminist critique of pornography is a politics" 
concerned, not with moral "good and evil," but with "power and 
powerlessness." 
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Pornography is "harmful in itself," not because of what it does 
to men, but because of what it does to women: "Pornography ob-
jectifies, degrades, and brutalizes women in the name of sexual stim-
ulation or entertainment for men." It does this to women as a class, 
to the female sex as such, and not only to the particular women who 
may be raped or otherwise assaulted by men stimulated by pornog-
raphy. The evil to be remedied is an attitude, one that sees women 
as worthless and powerless objects of domination by men. 
Given these premises, the ordinances in Minneapolis and Indi-
anapolis defined pornography as "the sexually explicit subordina-
tion of women, graphically or in words," of which both ordinances 
gave the following instances, among others: "women are presented 
as objects who enjoy pain or humiliation;" or "as sexual objects who 
experience sexual pleasure in being raped;" or "as sexual objects 
tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt;" or "in 
scenarios of degradation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, 
bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions 
sexual." 
In Minneapolis the mayor vetoed the ordinance as unconstitu-
tional; in Indianapolis the finding of unconstitutionality was made 
by federal courts. In the district court, Judge Sarah Evans Barker 
found that the ordinance sought to create "a newly-defined class of 
constitutionally unprotected speech, labeled 'pornography' and 
characterized as sexually discriminatory." The premise of the ordi-
nance was that "the State has so compelling an interest in regulat-
ing the sort of sex discrimination imposed and perpetuated through 
'pornography' that it warrants an exception to free speech." But 
the exception is not warranted, said Judge Barker, because it would 
"permit every interest group, especially those who claim to be vic-
timized by unfair expression, their own legislative exceptions to the 
First Amendment so long as they succeed in obtaining a majority of 
legislative votes in their favor." 
In the Court of Appeals, Judge Frank Easterbrook found that 
the ordinance went beyond obscenity law into thought control: 
"Speech that 'subordinates' women ... is forbidden, no matter how 
great the literary or political value of the work taken as a whole. 
Speech that portrays women in positions of equality is lawful, no 
matter how graphic the sexual context." Such a law cannot stand: 
"It establishes an 'approved' view of women. . . . Those who es-
pouse the approved view may use sexual images; those who do not, 
may not." 
Downs's response to the conservative and feminist critiques of 
pornography is "yes, but." He agrees that "democratic society has 
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a right to draw the line of tolerance at the worst, most degrading 
depictions of sex that are unredeemed by art." But art ("a treat-
ment of sexual reality that presents pornographic themes and scenes 
in an intellectual fashion which synthesizes passion and reason") 
brings all modes of expression under constitutional protection. 
He also agrees that there is such a thing as "sheer pornogra-
phy," which is not art and "reduces us to the lower aspects of our 
natures." The clearest example is "the association of pornography 
with masturbation." Yet masturbation is only ambiguously bad: it 
"may be part of normal sexual functioning or may weaken the abil-
ity to relate to another human being." Mere pornography, too, is 
therefore only ambiguously harmful. Healthy human beings live in 
a dialectic between the higher and lower sides of their natures, and 
so "even works that appear worthless or unimportant may actually 
be worthy of constitutional protection; we should always err on the 
side of protecting free speech." 
Downs's conclusion is a compromise of sorts: (1) "the printed 
word should be considered as completely covered by the First 
Amendment;" and (2) as for other media of expression, "present 
obscenity law should be retained but ... it should focus on violence 
rather than sexual explicitness." The "legal doctrine" of the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Miller v. California 4 therefore "should 
be modified to cover only violent obscenity," defined to include 
"portrayals of murder, dismemberment, brutality, or violence in the 
context of obscene acts (that is, those which depict ultimate sex 
acts, lewdly displayed naked bodies, or excess of sexual detail)." 
Other material previously considered obscene would be constitu-
tionally protected. In short, the experience in Minneapolis and In-
dianapolis leads Downs to recommend that we "recast the Miller 
approach, adjusting its rationale, its provisions, and its enforcement 
to reflect feminist concerns. It should focus on violent obscenity 
and the harm to women, while accommodating normative sexual 
expressions." 
The merit of this book is less in its specific recommendations, 
however, than in the fact that it opens to discussion questions which 
liberals have striven to foreclose. For example: 
1. Why would a rational and free people want a constitu-
tional freedom of speech and press? Why should we assume that 
such a people would intend to protect all expressions other than 
violent obscenity? 
2. Why should we accept Ronald Dworkin's radically indi-
4. 413 U.S. lS (1973). 
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vidualistic model of society as the basis for freedom of speech? The 
standard answer is that we are a pluralistic society, and that this 
social fact demands the neutrality of government toward all concep-
tions of the good life. But does pluralism demand that? Does 
Dworkin's policy achieve its stated goal of neutrality, or does it not 
rather impose on all of society a liberal orthodoxy which is chiefly 
attractive to a self-centered, educated, upwardly mobile, and well-
to-do opinion-making elite? 
3. Is it possible to make any judgment on "speech" without 
regarding its content? Granted that it is not the function of govern-
ment under our Constitution to pass judgment on the truth of doc-
trines, does it follow that government may never recognize the 
difference between political opinion and libel, religious speech and 
commercial advertising, scientific exposition and misrepresentation 
of facts, poetry and pornography? 
4. To what extent does the free marketplace of ideas actually 
lead society to a better grasp of truth, morality, or beauty? Have we 
in fact achieved John Stuart Mill's promised goals of a convergence 
of minds on true ideas that have withstood the test of criticism and 
more elevated standards of taste and conduct? Or have we tended 
rather toward a pervasive skepticism about even the possibility of 
realizing those goals? And if they are unrealizable, what makes 
freedom of speech so important? 
5. If we want a free marketplace of ideas-as the first amend-
ment tells us that we d~what will rank as an idea? Why should 
an "idea" be anything that anyone wants to express, in any way that 
he wants to express it? In regard specifically to pornography, why 
should chronic inflammation of the libido be considered worthy of 
constitutional protection? 
6. Why should we accept the "demonstration of direct 
harms" as the only ground for restricting "expressions"? Downs 
does not mention it, but the Supreme Court rejected that principle 
in a companion case to Miller v. California, where it said: "The 
sum of experience ... affords an ample basis for legislatures to con-
clude that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central 
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human 
personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial ex-
ploitation of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State 
from reaching such a conclusion and acting on it legislatively sim-
ply because there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data. "s 
7. What are liberals trying to safeguard in protecting pornog-
S. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). 
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raphy and, conversely, what would society lose if it banned "sheer 
pornography," which is, after all, most pornography? The standard 
answers are that all expressions do, or at least may, contain some-
thing of value, and that the loss sustained in any restriction of free-
dom of expression is always greater than the gain. But why should 
we believe that? 
Of course, these questions do not answer themselves; they are 
proposed here only as worth discussing seriously. Indeed, they 
must be discussed if we are to make sense of our constitutional free-
dom of speech. Downs seems to be aware of them, even though in 
the end he retreats into a slightly modified orthodox liberalism. But 
his book will have served a purpose if it helps to crack the shell of 
liberal denial that pornography is in any sense a problem, and 
makes it possible once again to face the questions that it raises. 
MARBURY v. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW. By 
Robert Lowry Clinton.t Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kan-
sas Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 332. $35.00 cloth. 
Kent Newmyer2 
Marbury v. Madison has always been the centerpiece in the his-
tory of judicial review. Its precise significance has, of course, been 
controversial. Some scholars, downplaying the originality of Mar-
shall's opinion, argue that the Court simply spelled out the logic of 
the Constitution itself. Others contend-some approvingly, others 
disapprovingly-that the Chief Justice went far beyond what the 
framers intended and essentially created judicial review. A few see 
the decision as almost entirely political-a shootout for power be-
tween Federalists and Jeffersonians as represented by those implaca-
ble enemies, Marshall and Jefferson. Even those scholars who leave 
some law in Marshall's opinion often emphasize the deft political 
maneuvering which got the Chief Justice to the legal position he 
wanted to reach. But whether the opinion is seen as declaratory of 
constitutional intent, or usurpatory, or somewhere in between, 
traditional scholarship recognizes Marbury as the special moment 
in the development of judicial power. 
Professor Robert Clinton challenges this fundamental proposi-
tion head on. Reading Marshall's opinion in light of contemporary 
canons of interpretation, derived from English common law as well 
1. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Illinois Univer.;ity. 
2. Professor of History, Univer.;ity of Connecticut. 
